In January 1933, Hitler was seen as the one solution to the problems that Germany faced, and he became chancellor of a fractured and disjointed country, ravaged by years of economic instability. Historians are not in agreement, however, as to the means through which he attained this position. Some take the intentionalist view and argue, such as Fischer, that Hitler was Germany’s destiny, while others, such as Meissner, take the structuralist view, that Hitler was merely the last resort for a government on the edge of collapse. This idea can be developed further to argue that, as much as Hitler was saving Germany by becoming chancellor, Germany was also saving Hitler and the Nazis, whose support was waning by 1933 and who may not have been such strong political contenders without Hitler’s appointment.

It can be argued that Hitler’s rise to power in January 1933 was the result of continuing public support for a party who offered Germany the chance to maintain her legacy of strong, autocratic leaders. This is the view that Fischer takes when he points out that it was conditions over a “sixty-year span” which led to the rise of Nazism in Germany, as he implies that German history dictated that Hitler should come to power to enforce the traditional ideals of “anti-Semitism, nationalism, imperialism.” There is certainly evidence to support this assertion that Hitler’s ideals reflected those of German leaders throughout history, as in 1890 there had been a growth of anti-Semitism amongst the ruling classes and Wilhelm II had used an aggressive foreign policy to placate the working classes and avoid a revolution. In describing Hindenburg as ‘short-sighted’, Fischer is alluding to his inability to comprehend this larger context of the history of German autocratic leaders, where Hitler ranked as a “charismatic genius.” The public support for Hitler that Fischer is alluding to cannot be denied, and in the March 1932 presidential elections he received 37% of the vote, while the Nazi party reached a similar level of success in the Reichstag elections in July of the same year. In source 2, Geary mentions that the Weimar government failed to win the “hearts and minds” of the people, and Hitler’s ability to do just that can be used as evidence that it was the result of huge public support that he became chancellor in January 1933. After the years of turmoil during World War One, the German people wanted a strong, united government that could drag them out of despair, and it can be said that this was precisely what the Nazi party were offering. Historians such as Fischer may argue that the strong, autocratic leader represented by Hitler was the main attraction of the Nazis, but it should be added that this appearance of an organised, traditional party was backed up with policies that genuinely appealed to the majority of the working classes of Germany. In the 25 Point Programme drafted by Hitler, the Nazis outlined their socialist ideology that would appeal to the masses, including promises of social provisions for the elderly, a new education system and confiscation of war profits. It can be argued that as well as providing a model of government similar to that which had run Germany for years throughout history, the Nazis were offering a fresh start and a break from the burdens of the Treaty of Versailles and its lasting repercussions, and this was what made them so popular. When Schliecher was chancellor in 1932-33, he appointed the Nazi Strasser as vice-chancellor in a bid to increase support for his government, and in Source 3 Meissner describes the reason for Hitler’s appointment as being to avoid “civil war”. These examples can be used as evidence to show that it was this public support for Hitler that was the defining factor in his appointment in January 1933.

Geary and Meissner are in concordance that Hitler and the Nazis came to power not through their own strength or credibility, but through the weakness and incompetence of the Weimar system of government that faced collapse by 1933. Fischer also mentions the “unstable political institutions and parties” of Germany, and Weimar’s lack of organisation and focus can be highlighted as a key reason for the success of Hitler and the Nazis. Devoid of any heroic myths surrounding its creation, and forever stigmatised by the Treaty of Versailles, during the years of the Weimar republic there were eighteen different governments, and no chancellor was able to hold together the fractious government for more than two years. While Hitler may not have been the “charismatic genius” that Fischer describes him as, in comparison to this disastrous political climate, it is unsurprising that he appeared to many as a stable and competent leader to drag Germany out of its years of turmoil. While Fischer mentions the “sixty-year span” of German history that justified Hitler’s popularity as an autocratic and traditional leader, it can be argued that this contextualising of history can also work in Hitler’s disfavour. Each historical period is undoubtedly judged in comparison to what preceded it and, just as for some even the chaotic Weimar government was seen as stable when compared to the horrific war years, the point of reference for judging Hitler’s government was always the disjointed Weimar republic, and it can be said that it was this, rather than his strength or popularity, that brought him success. It must be taken into account that, far from being the sole hope of Germany, Hitler was seen as the last resort by politicians throughout the period of Weimar government. When Bruning ruled via presidential decrees rather than through the Reichstag in the period 1930-33, he was tolerated by the SPD who said “anything but Hitler”, and this shows that despite Weimar’s weaknesses, he was never seen as the popular choice by everyone. Meissner highlights the fact that Hindenburg was reluctant to appoint Hitler as chancellor, and it was only the threat of a “revolt of national socialists and civil war” that swayed his opinion. This is in direct contrast to the picture painted of Hitler by Fischer as, far from being portrayed as the destiny of Germany, he is shown to be her final option, and subsequently it can be argued that it was desperation rather than popularity that finally brought about his appointment.

It can be said that their exploitation and manipulation of events that took place during the years of Weimar government was a key method Hitler and the Nazis used to gain support, and that it was this that ultimately led to their victory in January 1933. The Treaty of Versailles is something that both Fischer and Geary make reference to, and the opportunities it afforded to harvest the already strong hatred of the “November criminals” was something that the Nazis did not overlook. Their 25 Point Plan and numerous election campaigns promised an overturning of the treaty if they were put in power, and this was undoubtedly instrumental in their success. While Fischer may argue that these sentiments of hatred felt by the Germans relating to the Treaty and especially its clause of War Guilt were part of the historic sentiments of “nationalism”, it can be argued that it was only through Hitler and the Nazis continually harvesting these feelings of anger and bitterness that they were always at the forefront of the national psyche and the Weimar republic was unable to escape from this event that had crowned its birth. Fischer also mentions “catastrophic economic circumstances”, and the power of the unpredictable economic disasters that Weimar faced in increasing the popularity of the Nazis cannot be underplayed. During times of economic crisis, such as after the Wall Street Crash of 1929, the Nazis made huge gains in the Reichstag elections. This can be seen in the way that in the September 1930 elections, they won 18.3% of the vote, compared with the 2.6% they had won in the elections of May 1928. Bruning’s inability to rectify the problems brought about by the crash, such as one third of the population being unemployed, earned him the nickname the “hunger chancellor” and it was under his mismanagement of the economy that Hitler and the Nazis made the most gains. It can therefore be said that the ability of the Nazis to manipulate events that were out of their control in a way that made Weimar out to be the scapegoats and them as the only solution was a far more influential factor in Hitler’s appointment than the strength of their policies or the huge public support that they received. An example of the way that he manipulated and capitalised on public sentiments was the way that he took the lead in the Anti-Young Plan campaign of 1929, as he was able to unite nationalists against Weimar and the solutions it was offering to the economic problems of Germany, while at the same time securing his place at the forefront of the fight. The problem with this type of success that a structuralist historian would argue the Nazis enjoyed was its reliance on external events for its popularity, and the way that it depended on the failure of others, rather than success in its own right, for its popularity. While Meissner describes the way in which Hitler saved the country from “civil war”, one could go so far as to argue that as much as Hitler saved Weimar, Weimar also saved Hitler, whose popularity and influence was is decline due to improving circumstances in Germany. Although by the end of 1932 the Nazis were still the largest party in the Reichstag, in the elections in November of that year they lost two million votes, and seemed to have passed their peak. They were alienating middle-class voters through their radical propaganda and increasing support of the workers, and were also in financial crisis. Goebbels himself said that the Nazis could “win ourselves to death in elections”, and it appeared that as the international situation was improving, with the suspension of reparations being announced in 1932, the anti-Weimar argument the Nazis were pursuing no longer held such weight. In this context, Fischer’s description of Hitler as a “charismatic genius” bound for success by the popular policies he advocated seems not to ring true, and luck, both in the events which the Nazis were able to manipulate so skilfully, and in the timing of his appointment, seems a more relevant factor in his rise to power.

While historians will never be totally in agreement as to the means through which Hitler secured the chancellorship in January 1933, it can be argued that it was the weakness of the Weimar republic and events out of its control that ultimately secured its downfall and consequently the rise of the Nazis. While those such as Fischer may argue that Hitler was merely fulfilling a sixty-year legacy of strong leaders and traditional ideologies, it can be said that without the events that took place, such as the Treaty of Versailles and the Wall Street Crash, the Nazis would not have had the opportunity to exploit these ideologies to their advantage and secure power in the way that they did.

Y.S.

On 30 th January 1933, President Hindenburg grudgingly agreed to allow Adolf Hitler, leader of the NSDAP party to become Chancellor of Germany, after being persuaded by the previous Chancellor, von Papen. To understand how Hitler and the Nazis were able to come to power in January 1933, it is important to look at the events leading up to this decision, when support of the Nazi party from different sections of German society increased.

The source written by Fischer, and the one by Geary both point to the situation at the time as a key point that aided the rise of the Nazi party. Fischer’s source lists a number of different factors from the 6 years leading up to Hitler’s rise, which includes things like the “catastrophic economic circumstances”, as well as “unstable political institutions”. This links to the point made from the extract from “Hitler and Nazism”, which points the finger at the weakness of the Weimar Republic to consolidate its newfound power. The Nazis were able to come to power in 1933 due to this, in the fact that the circumstances at the time were so dire that people sought a radical alternative as well as a viable way out of the crisis – two things that the Nazi party offered. The fact that the situation in the country as a whole led to popular support of Nazism can be seen in the fact that after the Depression of 1929 struck, in the Reichstag elections of July 1932, Nazi support rose to a high of 37.4% of the vote. In the following election, in November of the same year, after the crisis had faded away to a degree, their support dwindled to 33.1% of the vote. However, just 3 months after this, Hitler was offered the role of Chancellor, showing that popular support wasn’t the only factor in Hitler rising to power.

The “myopia” of Hindenburg and his “conservative clique” is mentioned as a reason for the Nazi rise to power in Fischer’s source, as well as is shown by Meissner’s account in Source 3. In this, Meissner talks about the fact that Hindenburg was in fact “extremely hesitant” in appointing Hitler as Chancellor, and that he did so under persuasion from von Papen that he would be hindered by other right-wing parties and the lack of numbers of Nazi members in the cabinet, and so could be controlled. However, this was eventually proved to be wrong, in that largely ignoring cabinet and closing the Reichstag, Hitler was able to by-pass all that prevented him from setting up the dictatorship that he craved. His becoming Chancellor in January 1933 was essential to this, and would not have been possible if not for the persuasion of von Papen, as well as his successor Kurt von Schleicher as well as the press magnate Alfred Hugenburg, who all spent the months in the lead-up to Hitler’s appointment trying to get Hitler into power. The fact that these members of the conservative “clique” talked about in Source 1 was a key factor in Hitler and the Nazi party’s ascendancy to power, as Hindenburg did hold reservations as to whether Hitler would in fact be a good appointment. Another point proving the significance of the actions of the people around Hindenburg as a means of Hitler coming to power in January 1933 is that the Nazi party were still not a majority party in the Reichstag, showing that even in spite of the lack of majority support from the people of Germany, Hitler was able to come to power. This shows that the convincement of Hindenburg could have been more important than any popular support, as Hitler becoming Chancellor relied on Hindenburg agreeing to let it be so, which was not true in terms of support in Germany.

Fischer’s source names the “charismatic genius of Hitler” as a reason for his success in January 1933 – something not picked up on in the other two sources. It could be linked to Meissner’s source, in that the 3 rd source shows that von Papen amongst others were convinced that Hitler could be controlled – something that was proved very untrue. This could show a level of “genius” stated by Fischer, in that Hitler had begun lessening the radical measures he was using, as can be seen later on by his eradication of one of the most radical wings of the party – the SA in the Night of the Long Knives. However, it seems that Meissner’s point of “charismatic genius” relates more heavily to the fact that Hitler was essential to the Nazi party in coming to power, with great oratory, as well as leadership skills used in boosting Nazi support at the time. In the time he spent in prison after the failed Munich Putsch, the party failed to gain any widespread support, and it was only after his release in December 1924 that this improved. Before this time, the party never received more than 6.5% of the votes for in the Reichstag elections; within 8 years this had gone up to 37.4%. This was in part due to the principles he brought to the party, such as the Führerprinzip, which helped in uniting the party, as well as awarding more power in the party to Hitler. He was flexible in what he actually said to German people, in that if he made a speech to a select group of people, he could tailor it to suit their wishes. This could have helped him in compelling von Papen to seek to make him the new chancellor in 1933.

All three sources agree that the political situation that was in place was a factor that helped Hitler and the Nazis achieve power. The 1 st source notes the “unstable” political institutions, while Source 2 talks more about the weaknesses of the Weimar Republic in making the most of the “fundamental compromises” achieved in 1918. Source 3, meanwhile, shows von Papen’s view that if Hitler did not become chancellor, that “a revolt…and civil war were likely”, showing that the system in place was not a secure one. This was seized on by Hitler, himself the leader of an undemocratic party in the Nazis. If the Weimar system in place was more solid, then it may have been more difficult for a party like the Nazis to come to power, who used violence as a method of political campaigning. There was not enough solid political opposition at the time to challenge the Nazi party. The next two largest parties in Germany at the time were the SPD and the KPD, who become so involved in bitter fighting between themselves that Hitler’s rise to power went largely unchallenged. The undemocratic way in which Hitler became chancellor and the ease at which he was able to consolidate his power after this also show the weakness of the system. Hitler was able to exploit all of this to ensure that he did eventually come to power in 1933.

In conclusion, Hitler came to power in January 1933 due to a number of reasons, including the fact that he had raised the Nazi party to a reasonable standing in Germany as a whole, as can be seen by the fact that they were the most popular party since the July 1932 elections. However, more importantly was the fact that the weakness of the political structure at the time meant that with persuasion from a few members of the conservative elite to President Hindenburg, Hitler was able to come into a very high position in Germany without needing a majority in the Reichstag, from where he went on to consolidate his power with events such as Gleischaltung and the Night of the Long Knives.

M.M.

It cannot be denied that over the years Adolf Hitler, rather the party itself, has become synonymous with the Nazi regime, and while historians have called into question the efficiency of the administrative side of his leadership, his appearance to the German people as a strong and dynamic leader has never been challenged. However, while this charismatic leadership had the power to offset daily problems faced by the German population and therefore played a key role in the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft, it must not be forgotten that other mechanisms were equally relevant in securing the unity of the country. It can be argued that propaganda and terror were just as influential in enforcing Nazi ideology, as while propaganda encouraged the German people to embrace Nazism, terror punished those who refused to do so, and therefore these antagonistic systems maintained the status quo of the nation. Finally, it is necessary to examine the possibility that the feeling of “certain basic consent” that was dominant in Germany stemmed not from any particular constructed mechanism of control, but from a general happiness with the Nazi party and their policies.

Ian Kershaw is most definite in his appraisal of Hitler’s leadership qualities being the binding element of the Nazi regime and when he says, “the Fuhrer would certainly right all wrongs in Nazi Germany” he depicts him as an almost messianic figure of redemption. This concept of Hitler restoring Germany to greatness after the destructive years of Weimar was judged by many to be the ultimate triumph of the regime, and one which rendered irrelevant the everyday problems linked to the Nazi party itself. It was in this way that Hitler’s charismatic leadership distanced him from the everyday running of Germany, and meant that unhappiness was, as Peukert states, “related primarily to practical everyday matters” while Hitler himself was “largely exempt from criticism.” It can be argued that Hitler’s presentation as part of the historical tradition of strong German leaders was the reason that general “grumbling” never developed into ideological or political unrest as people felt that as Hitler was ‘Germany’s destiny’, there was surely no one more adept to rule. The problem that arises is how to gauge the popular support that Hitler enjoyed as leader, as while it was reported in the late 1930s that 90% of Germans admired the Fuhrer, the bias connected with such a statistic must be taken into account. More reliable an indicator of the effect of his charismatic leadership was the social rather than political focus of the opposition to the regime; while there were 400 strikes by workers between 1933 and 1935, it was not until the war that organised resistance with Hitler’s ideological beliefs as the focus materialised, with the formation of the White Rose Group in 1942.

It should be noted that if the German people perceived Hitler to be a charismatic and capable leader, this opinion was heavily influenced by propaganda, and the role that this instrument of control had in securing the Volksgemeinschaft should not be overlooked. Speer highlights the importance that technology had in persuading Germans of the greatness of their leader and such a tactic was evident in films such as “Triumph of the Will” which documented Hitler speaking at a Nuremberg Rally. However, Speer also argues that through such propaganda, people were brainwashed to such an extent that they became a population who “uncritically obeys orders.” However, it should be remembered that in this statement Speer is trying to excuse himself from implication in the Nazi regime, and as such it is to be expected that he would argue that everyone was under the grip of Hitler and powerless to stop his indoctrination. It can be argued that Kershaw’s more holistic view on the role of propaganda is closer to the truth, as he highlights the fact that Goebbels alone was not able to convince a whole country of the greatness of one man; their inherent need for a charismatic and heroic figure was just as relevant after the chaotic and fractured years of Weimar. McDonough concurs with this view that the propaganda machine was not all-powerful in convincing the public of Hitler’s charismatic leadership, as the fact that German’s were making jokes about the seemingly perfect Fuhrer proves that his popularity was not total. While propaganda played a part in facilitating the depiction of Hitler as a charismatic leader, it was also an instrument of unity in its own right. Goebbels said, “propaganda was our sharpest weapon in conquering the state”, and the fact that the German people were provided with no alternative or point of reference with which to judge the system under which they lived impeded resistance with an ideological focus, as people had, as the SOPADE report points out, no “conception of what should take its (the regime) place.” It can therefore be argued that while propaganda was not an infallible tool of control in Nazi Germany, it was just as influential as Hitler’s charismatic leadership in promoting the Volksgemeinschaft, as it served to wear down the German population into a state of submission.

It should not be forgotten that Nazi Germany was first and foremost a police state, and when the unity of the country was under threat, terror played a key role in ensuring that any resistance was quickly quashed. Led by the SS, the complex police structure of the Nazi state was ingrained in all levels of society and Kershaw admits that “organised terror played a key role” in establishing an unchallenged dictatorship. Speer also points out the importance of terror in creating unity, referring in particular to the “far reaching supervision of the citizens of the state.” However, it must be taken into account that 50-80% of Gestapo investigations stemmed from voluntary denunciations, and this shows how feelings of suspicion and fear were harvested in such a way that citizens actively supervised each other. It is ironic that through this lack of comradeship amongst Germans, unity and respect increased towards Hitler and the Nazis, and this proves that fear was just as important as respect in keeping the peace. Just as propaganda worked to persuade Germans of the benefits of adhering to the principles of the Nazi Volksgemeinschaft, terror worked to discourage them from deviating from them, and therefore both were mechanisms integral to creating unity.

Instead of searching for methods through which the Nazi party forced unity onto its people, one should consider the possibility that the stability of Germany was maintained simply through a sense of general happiness with the regime and its actions. Peukert highlights the “certain basic consent” which was the overriding sentiment under Nazi rule despite the small-scale “grumbling” which it can be argued are inherent of any political system. Of all the five sources, it is the SOPADE report that is the most dramatic about the feelings of anger directed towards Nazism and its policies, with people apparently expressing the opinion that “things can’t be worse after Hitler.” It should be noted, however, that as an opposition party in exile the SPD would want to present the German people as seeking to rebel against the Nazis and therefore we must consider the possibility that there may be some exaggeration in terms of the level and strength of discontent described in the source. Statistics relating to the economy and employment can also be used as evidence to support the view that the lack of active resistance to the regime resulted merely from a sense of happiness with living under Nazi rule. From 1932 to 1938, unemployment fell from 5.6 million to 0.2 million and in 1936 the average wage was 35 marks a week, which was ten times the amount of dole money millions had been receiving during the unstable years of the depression before the Nazis came to power. Such figures suggest that while workers may have felt discontent relating to economic or social issues under Hitler, the fact that such problems would always be dwarfed by those that had occurred in the years preceding his leadership ensured that resistance remained minimal.

Through their presentation of mockery directed towards the regime, both Peukert and McDonough show that people were not afraid to speak out against Nazism, and this suggests that the fact that there was little political resistance under Hitler was due not to a lack of courage but rather a lack of deep-seated discontent. While McDonough argues that “humour was a low-level form of opposition”, insulting the regime, especially the Fuhrer, would have been harshly punished, and this suggests that if ordinary Germans were willing to put themselves in danger through expressing their opinions in this light-hearted manner, they would not have hesitated to take direct action if they felt it necessary.

It would be wrong to underestimate the impact that Hitler’s charismatic leadership had on maintaining the cohesion of the fractious administrative systems of the Nazi Government in the 1930s, and while not all Germans viewed him as the messianic figure described by Kershaw, his respect and distance from the regime had the power to brush over the cracks that appeared. While both propaganda and terror acted as key devices for the creation of the Volksgemeinschaft, it can be argued that the evidence provided by McDonough serves to prove that even these key tenets of control were limited in their success, as despite forces of persuasion and oppression, people were still capable of formulating their own ideas, notwithstanding Spear’s proclamation to the contrary. It can therefore be concluded, that it was popular policies rather than any contrived mechanism that insured support for the Nazis remained strong and unity reigned for so many years.

As soon as Hitler came to power as Chancellor of Germany in January 1933, he set about liquidating the traditional power structures and political institutions that had held so much power during the years of Weimar and replacing them with his own, far more complex systems. While Otto Dietrich argued that Hitler produced the “biggest confusion in government that has ever existed in a civilised state”, this is not an opinion that I share. On the contrary, I believe that Hitler carefully constructed the organised chaos that was synonymous with the government throughout his rule, as the overlapping spheres of influence and social Darwinism that existed below him ensured that his position as leader of the party remained unrivalled. It can also be argued that as his rule progressed, Hitler became increasingly distanced from the infighting of the party, instead establishing himself as a separate entity, until he became the embodiment of Nazi values and his will became the central thesis of the party and its policies, thus rendering him an absolute and unchallenged dictator.

Brozat highlights a key method that Hitler used to build a government of competing competences – that of giving numerous individuals jobs that were highly similar. He describes the way that through the confusing title of “Reich SS Leader and Chief of German Police within the Reich Ministry of the Interior” Himmler’s role was undeniably entwined with that of Frick, the Minister of the Interior, and the inevitable result of this was the social Darwinism and sense of competition that characterised the ideological foundation of the Nazi party. Through ensuring that members of the government were always faced with a rival charged with performing a similar task to them, Hitler was able to cement his own superiority, as those in the party were too occupied trying to secure their own position above that of their peers to pose a threat to his. A succinct example of such an environment was the Reich Chancellery. Built in 1938 to symbolise the power and might of Nazism, it also characterised the confused structure of government that Hitler thrived on. With no clear hierarchy, and at one point five plenipotentiary offices claiming to represent Hitler, it became an administrative jungle where only the most skilful, such as Lammers, would emerge triumphant.

Huttenberger makes reference to the fact that Hitler allowed government bodies to “function as autonomous political units” but that it was “loyalty” which was the overriding sentiment shadowing the work that such organisations carried out. While it cannot be denied that Hitler did bestow power onto select Nazi organisations, it can be argued that the way that such organisations were sub-divided meant that their influence was lessened and would never reach a level that would rival his own. After the Night of the Long Knives in 1934, the SS emerged as the dominant police force, and held a huge amount of power in Germany, being described by Hite and Hinton as a “state within a state.” Despite this, Hitler ensured that the group posed him no threat, by splitting it up into various, competing subsections such as Orpo, the municipal police, Kripo, the criminal police and Sipo, the security police. The Gestapo and SD were also part of this complex network and as such the power that the SS as a whole held was severely curtailed by being divided and split between these factions. Borzat describes the way that Hitler was careful not to allow Himmler to become too powerful, denying him ministerial rank and the opportunity to attend all Reich Cabinet meetings, and it can therefore be seen that both the leader and the organisation itself were carefully managed by Hitler to ensure their authority remained always secondary to his own. While one could suppose that the individual units of such an umbrella organisation would be able to combine forces and use their cumulative power to threaten Hitler’s role as a strong dictator, the power of the “divide and rule” tactics employed by Hitler must not be underestimated. Himmler displays in Source 2 the acts of brutality that members of the party would execute in order to prove their own worth, and it is evident that Hitler created a fractured government, where mistrust was encouraged and personal endeavour was valued above everything else. Dietrich’s assumption about the disorder that Hitler created must therefore be reassessed, as while it may be true that the party underneath him was chaotic and complex, it was an organised chaos and one harvested by Hitler to ensure the safety of his own dictatorial position.

Through the chaos of Nazi government, one factor that had a huge impact on the level a member could reach in the party was the nature of their relationship with Hitler, and it was only through him that success would be reached. It was in this way that Hitler profited from the hierarchical minefield of the regime to protect his role as a strong dictator, as he was indispensable to those wishing to further themselves in the party, and as such it was only the select few that he liked and trusted who were able to become influential within the establishment. Padfield highlights the fact that Himmler possessed the charm that was necessary for him to succeed in the party and Brozat demonstrates the practical impact this had on his position within the government. While he and Frick were made rivals and Himmler’s title suggested subjugation to the Minister of the Interior, it was the fact that he was “directly responsible to the Führer in his capacity as Reich SS Leader” that turned the tide and allowed him to “reverse this relationship”. It can therefore be seen that it was closeness to Hitler rather than any other skills or achievements that would bring rewards to those trying to prove their worth in the party. The rise of Martin Bormann is another example of a good relationship with Hitler transforming the fortunes of a Nazi party member. From joining the party as a regional press officer he became Hitler’s private secretary and effectively his second in command, all through his close relationship with the Führer, and his willingness to tackle the administrative dilemmas that Hitler despised. When Bormann took over from Hess as leader of the Party Chancellery in 1941 its influence as an organisation increased significantly, showing how a closeness to Hitler was able to transform even whole institutions and that it was individuals rather than groups who held the real power in Nazi Germany.

While it cannot be denied that the system of government under Hitler was chaotic, I do not agree that this impeded on his ability to remain a strong dictator, as matters were never allowed to run out of his control and he was always able to thwart the rise of those he felt were gaining too much power. Himmler describes the way in which Hitler deftly eliminated the left wing of the party in the Night of the Long Knives, and the fact that in doing so he also gained the loyalty of the army demonstrates how the strengthening of his position as a strong dictator was always at the forefront of his mind. Kersten also makes reference to the alarm that was always present in the Nazi party when he describes how even Himmler, who was amongst those closest to Hitler was “in a state of fear before his audiences with the Führer”. This shows that even those who had risen through the chaos of the regime to reach the top of the party were aware of the fact that their positions were by no means assured, and that Hitler remained in control of those beneath him at all times. It can be argued that far from jeopardising Hitler’s ability to rule Germany as a strong dictator, the chaos that defined the structure of the Nazi party meant that his position was strengthened, as he distanced himself from the infighting of those below him and was seen as a separate and greater force. Huttenberger says that Hitler relied on groups within the party to autonomously work “in all those spheres in which he paid them no attention”, and suggests that it was only through this “substructure” that he could “maintain his position”. This point of view can be expanded to say that Hitler separated himself from the details and administration of the party not only because it was of little interest to him, but also because it allowed him to be viewed by the public as a lone figure, not involved with the competition and confusion of the party below him. This distinction that was made between the chaos of the Nazi party and the strong, organised leadership of Hitler worked greatly to his favour, as while the popularity of the party had dipped by the mid 1930s, Hitler’s popularity remained strong until 1943. As the party itself became less relevant to the Nazi regime Hitler became more so, until he became the embodiment of the ideals of Nazism and a personalised system of monocracy developed, where the complex structure of government had the sole aim of interpreting and enforcing the will of the Führer. Kershaw explores this idea of Hitler being seen as an almost messianic figure when he describes how “Hitler’s personalised power was able to free itself from all institutional constraints and become absolute.” In this way, the Nazi regime became so tailored to Hitler and his personality that the threat from the chaos of the party below became virtually obsolete.

I do not agree that the confusing structure of Nazi government prevented Hitler from being a strong dictator in the years 1933-45, as it was through these complex organisations that he was able to emerge as Germany’s unrivalled leader and to ensure that this post remained unchallenged by those below him in the party. With no official governing body like the Politburo in Soviet Russia, and those able to survive the tests of social Darwinism being given only a small chunk of power, Hitler’s position as leader of Germany was never under threat, and his influence merely increased, as he cemented his position as the supreme dictator in a country where everyone was “working towards the Führer.” ....... Y.S.

There has always been a lively debate between historians regarding the extent of Hitler’s power. On the one hand, people such as Rich believe that he was the sole decision maker in the Third Reich; whereas others, such as Mommsen believe that he was unwilling to make decisions and take charge of his country. Through the use of propaganda and fear to a certain extent, Hitler was able to portray an image of great power and was turned into a messianic figure. It is a known fact that his government was poorly structured and caused confusion due to conflicting remits between departments. While this arrangement has its obvious flaws, some believe it to have been created for a purpose, a key idea discussed in this essay.

Historians have three ways of describing Hitler’s rule; intentionalist, structuralist and representative of the wants of the German people. Traditionally he has been seen as a strong dictator and as the key policy and decision maker, as backed up by Bracher: “The omnipotent power of the Führer was the basic law of the Third Reich”. Revisionists believe Hitler was a weak dictator who was indecisive and delegated decision making, as seen by the quotation by Rauschning: “Hitler was no dictator”. Today however, historians are not sure about the strength of Hitler’s rule. They see him as a key activator and legitimator of policies, but not someone who actually initiates or implements them. This view emerged only recently, at the end of the Cold War. Documents found in countries occupied by the Nazis at the end of the Second World War were seized by the Communists who now occupied most of them.

It is a known fact that Hitler believed in social-Darwinisn. This was evident from the onset of his political career, and his key view of the power of the Aryan. Hitler believed that if he was not specific in his direction to party members, they would be forced to interpret his words. Therefore, he would be presented with different ideas, and he could choose the best one. A very similar idea existed within the party. There was constant competition for Hitler’s favour, as seen by Martin Bormann’s ideology. Bormann felt threatened by Himmler who had been closer to Hitler and a member of the party for longer than he had been himself. Himmler had to go away for long stretches of time, and accused Bormann of blocking his messages to Hitler. He viewed himself as the strongest in society, and did not mind if those below him perished on his ascent. Kershaw states that: “Through working towards the Führer…his aims were met without the dictator necessarily having to dictate”. This may have provided a chaos in a sense, but work was still being done, and policies made, so this does not agree with the statement that Hitler was a weak dictator. It could be said that because he allowed this chaos to ensue, he was not strong enough to keep a firm grip on his country, but it is clear he only allowed it because he believed he would be left with the most able people in charge.

At the start of his regime, Hitler relied on his moderate oratory skills and mass rallies coordinated by Reich Minister for Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Goebbles. He communicated with the German people, at some rallies walking with them. This appeared to show his mortality combined with his demi-divinity. According to Burleigh: “Hitler milked these rallies for every last once…a firm handshake and exchanges of prolonged manly stares”. This shows that he at one time enjoyed meeting the people, and talking to them. However further into his rule, Hitler felt the need to organise crowds to cheer, whereas a few years before he would have relied on spontaneity. It seems he have moved on from admiring the masses and tended to be angry and impatient:

“Two years before [in 1937], he would have stepped out on the balcony.

Now he snapped at his adjutants when they asked him to show himself,

and told them to ‘stop bothering me with that’”.

It is clear that the pressures of dealing with the day to day running of such a large country had left Hitler stressed and needing to delegate some of his work onto others. This shows that perhaps Hitler was not as strong as portrayed and had a heavy reliance on others, a fact further shown by his reluctance to leave the Berghof.

The work delegation aforementioned was usually given to the top Nazis, for example Himmler, Goering and Goebbels. According to Padfield: “The hard will…painstaking work that Himmler put in inspired respect”. It is clear this is due to genuine feelings and desires to please Hitler because Kersten states: “Himmler was in a state of fear before his audiences with the Führer…rejoiced if he came out of the interview successfully”. It is further shown by the quotation from Himmler himself: “[the Night of the Long Knives] was the hardest day that can ever be visited on a soldier in his lifetime”. This shows that Hitler obviously scared his party members enough to make them work hard for him, and in that respect was a strong dictator. But on the other hand, him allotting his work onto others gave him the image or a weak man who relied upon others, or as Rauschning stated: “He always marched with the big battalions”.

Hitler did not only use the leading members to do his work; he also used the Gauleiters, “the backbone of [Hitler’s] power”. Rauschning was an acquaintance of Hitler who became disillusioned with him stated that: “He never ran counter to the opinion of his Gauleiter. Each of these men was in his power, but together they held him in theirs”. Each Gauleiter was directly answerable to Hitler, but he knew that he needed to keep them on side because they were the way that his will was conveyed to the people. However, Kershaw’s analysis is a much more convincing analysis of Hitler’s relationship with them, rather than them dominating him. It gives the impression that Hitler respected the power held by others, and their responsibility to the regime and did not want to interfere unless totally necessary. This makes him a strong dictator because it shows that while he has let some of his personal power slip, he allows others to work with him, therefore getting an assortment of ideas.

Under the Enabling Act, the Reichstag had little power because Hitler could make laws without consulting them, and as a result, it rarely met. Instead decisions were made by officials interpreting Hitler’s words and turning them into detailed policies. He was involved in the decision making even though it was his will that was being implemented. There was no formal power or decision making structure; Hitler’s will was law. There was no formal structure and plans were made orally rather than on paper. Because much of his time was spent away from the public, Lammers acted as intermediary between officials and Hitler. In the Reich Chancellery, law making was chaos. As Hitler favoured plenipotentiaries, at one point there were five chancellery offices all claiming to represent Hitler doing the same jobs. The rivalry between them resulted in a growing brutality and lawlessness which has been said to have led to the Holocaust. Hitler’s words were interpreted in different ways, as was the danger in this form of decision making system, and were often radicalised (for example the idea of eugenics), but resulted in Hitler being given all the power he wanted; an idea supported by Kershaw:

            “The disintegration of the formal machinery of government and the

accompanying radicalisation decisively shaped the process by which

Hitler’s personal power was able to become absolute”.

Both of the above decision making methods depict a none too perfect method. Considering the Third Reich was very bureaucratic, there was very little paperwork done by Hitler himself. This shows that there was no way that amid all the chaos that he could have been a strong dictator. He would have expected one outcome, but due to differing interpretations, the outcome he received could have been very different. It was not a professional way of running a country, but due to his personal preferences of social-Darwinism, this would have enabled him to see who the best in their field was. This idea combined with the operation of plenipotentiaries would have soon shown who were the weaker branches and could therefore be disbanded. It is the opinion of both Brozat and Mommsen that the workings of the state were essentially chaotic because Hitler was unwilling to regulate or create an organized system of government.

The fact that Hitler in effect delay consolidating the church and the army until so late in his Gleischaltung campaign shows that even he believed he was too weak to effectively do it in the beginning. The church had a large following, and at this tender stage in his rule, Hitler could not afford to anger either the Pope or the large number of supporters he had in Germany. Similarly he waited until all other areas of traditional institutions had been consolidated before he attempted to change the army. He treaded carefully by reassuring the army by destroying the SA and getting an oath of loyalty. But regardless, the army could be a very powerful force if they felt threatened. Hitler decided to leave it structurally unchanged although allowing it to grow in size until 1938.

The fact that Hitler stepped very carefully is in no way a reflection on him as a weak dictator. It made him stronger to successfully identify his biggest threats and recognise when they could be changed and when they could not. It would have been foolish of him to charge in without serious thought.

As previously stated, historians rarely see eye-to-eye on the topic of Hitler’s power and level of control of the party. Rich has stated: “The point cannot be stressed too strongly; Hitler was master in the Third Reich”. This is a strong statement and has been further strengthened by Jäckel and Hildebrand: “Hitler sat at the heart of the regime, intentionally dividing and ruling his lieutenants”. However this view is too simple and suggests that Hitler intentionally formed the political structure in which he operated. This had met with a great deal of opposition, not least from Mommsen. He believes that:

“Hitler was unwilling to make decisions, frequently uncertain, exclusively

concerned with upholding his prestige and personal authority, influenced

in the strongest fashion by his entourage, in some respects a weak dictator”.

Yet, despite this implying that Hitler could not possibly have formed the NSDAP way of policy making, it also shows somewhat of a misunderstanding of Hitler’s role and significance in the state. According to Collier and Pedley, “Hitler was Führer, the army had sworn an oath of loyalty to him, and he had the SS. His power as head of state, party and the military was unassailable”. Leni Riefenstahl’s The Triumph of the Will (1934) portrayed Hitler as a figure worshipped by German people, almost a demi-God. The way in which he was represented by propaganda allowed him to distance himself from the day-to-day running of Germany because he was seen as too powerful. Despite his misgivings of the power of Hitler, Mommsen disagrees that there was a lack of direction and planning from the Führer. He believes that in the case of policies he felt strongly about (for example Jews and foreign policy), Hitler played a central role in decision making. He apparently ordered the passing of the Nuremburg Laws in 1935 and approved all anti-Semitic action.

However, the main disputer of the Führer’s power and authority in his own dictatorship is Kershaw. The Hitler Myth states that his power was little more than a cultivated image that shows Hitler as being a ‘Messianic’ figure. The overall effectiveness of the myth is shown by the contribution it made to Hitler’s great personal popularity. By the late 1930s, an estimated 90 percent of Germans admired him. It sustained the regime and brought most Germans together whilst helping to cover the regime’s failures. However, the myth eventually contributed to the decline of the Third Reich after Hitler started to believe in it himself: “The day in which Hitler started to believe in his own myth marked in a sense the beginning of the end of the Third Reich”.

It is fair to say that Hitler built the party up from the day he joined, helping writing the twenty-five point programme and being a prominent figure. It was he who decided that the NSDAP needed to become a political party and seize power through the Reichstag rather than through putsches. According to Burleigh: “With Ludendorff discredited, Hitler was fast becoming the uncontested leader of the movement”. He goes on to say that “the emergent totalitarian style of leadership…was not universally popular within the party”. This could imply that Hitler chose to keep out of the limelight because he knew that he may not be as popular as some believed and wished to keep his party in power.

To conclude, I believe the structure of Nazi government to be chaotic. However I believe it was, although not intended to be so, Hitler’s way of ensuring he had only the best people in his leadership group. By using his beliefs in social-Darwinism, he aimed to provide only the best for his country, unusual for a dictator seeming to have a heart. However, in doing so he had to produce “The biggest confusion in government that has ever existed in a civilised state” H.L.

“Radar and excellent fighters account for Britain’s victory in the Battle of Britain.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?

It can be argued that radar and excellent fighters account for Britain’s victory in the Battle of Britain. This essay will look to assess the role played by radar and the enormous advantage that it gave Britain in locating enemy aircraft, and also the use of excellent fighter planes and pilots without which Britain would have surely been defeated by the Luftwaffe. On the 16 th July 1940 Hitler issued a directive for the invasion of Britain, which he called ‘Operation Sea Lion’, for the 15 th September ‘if necessary’. The German navy, however, was in no position to fight due to huge losses in the Norwegian campaign and so air supremacy became essential. The German army was justifiably confident and there can be no doubt that had they landed on British land they would not have faced well organized opposition. Thus whether or not Britain was successfully invaded depended entirely upon whether or not the Luftwaffe could wear down the RAF to the point where it could not protect the ships of the Royal Navy trying to stop the invasion. Overall, both sides were fairly evenly matched going into battle, but it was Britain who were able to claim victory at the end and there are a variety of different reasons for this. Radar, in my opinion, gave Britain the crucial advantage over the Luftwaffe. The quality of the fighter planes and fighter pilots also played a part in the successful defence, but not to such a great extent as the role of radar because it can be argued that there was no real ‘leading edge’ over the German ‘Luftwaffe’. Other factors were crucial. The Royal Navy played a vital role. Britain was brilliantly led throughout the battle by Air Chief Marshall Hugh Dowding and Sir Keith Rodney Park, a senior Commander of the Royal Air Force. It can be argued though that the decisive moment in Britain’s victory in the Battle of Britain was a German mistake; the catastrophic decision to change their tactics at the height of the battle. What is certain is that it was the mixture of these components that led to the victory for Britain and that each contributed in its own way, and this essay will set out to prove this.

The invention and successful implementation of radar was arguable the most important factor in Britain’s victory during the Battle of Britain. ‘If only we knew when they were coming! We could be up in the air and waiting for them!’ This was the opinion of Hugh Dowding after his own experiences of fighting during the First World War, and he would soon get his wish when the Department of Research and Development finally invented radar in 1938. Radar would now become the ‘very eyes of our defence system’, he claimed, and this was very much the case for it could detect the height, severity and the direction of each incoming air raid. It thus eliminated the need for random patrols and allowed for much better use Britain’s available aircraft and pilots. Over the next three years further work was carried out to get the information to the required departments swiftly and clearly, so that the RAF could dispatch aircraft to the correct locations, meet the intruders and engage in battle. It was a central part of a sophisticated integrated control and warning system, which included over 1000 observer corps posts, radio telephones and operations rooms – all under the extremely able leadership of Hugh Dowding. It was, for the time, a hugely sophisticated early detection and warning system and was a key part of the jigsaw to Britain’s successful defence.

Britain had excellent fighter planes during the Battle of Britain in the Hurricane and the Spitfire which arguably helped compensate for the numerical advantage that the Luftwaffe had. The Luftwaffe’s 2500 planes compared to the RAF’s 1000 looks an enormous advantage but is actually fairly deceptive as half the German planes were inept for battle. In terms of any technological advantage, it can be argued that each side cancelled out the other. The British Spitfire, for example, had an elliptical wing which allowed for a higher top speed than the Hurricane and also gave it the distinctive appearance and iconic British symbol status that it has today. The Hurricane, on the other hand, was much slower but no less effective. In fact, between July and October 1940 the Hurricane was responsible for 80% of all shot down enemy aircraft. The Messershmitt, on the other hand, was an excellent fighter plane and proved a fairly equal match for the British Spitfire. Thus, in terms of aircraft superiority, the RAF had no real ‘leading edge’ over the Luftwaffe. What they did have to their advantage, however, was the simple fact that the battle was fought over Britain. When a British plane was shot down, the pilot could escape from the aircraft and return to fight again. But if the same happened to a German plane, the pilot would become a prisoner of war. What the German planes had in speed and agility, they lacked in range because they could only carry enough fuel for 30 minutes flight time over Britain. These were two enormous advantages for Britain and were crucial in it’s successful defence.

Although aircraft production was good (400 planes per month), pilots could not be trained at such a rate and thus the RAF were desperately short of pilots. This is why the contribution of foreign pilots who volunteered to fight was so crucial. Pilots came from all over the world, and particularly from the British Empire, to help the RAF – there were Poles, Canadians, Australians, West Indians and South Africans who, all together, totalled an enormous 25% of the RAF fighter pilots. As a result, the Battle of Britain was eventually won by a small, but elite, group of 3000 pilots of whom over a thousand were killed or wounded. As Churchill put it, ‘never in the field of human conflict has so much been owed to so many to so few’.

It could be argued, however, that the idea of the ‘few’ and its heroic, legendary status is simply a myth constructed to boost British morale and spirit at the time. Many historians argue that it was not won by the Royal Air Force at all - but by the Royal Navy. The number of destroyers and battleships in the Channel would, they argue, have obliterated any invasion fleet even if the RAF had lost air superiority. The historian Brian James argues "Many still prefer to believe that in the course of that summer a few hundred outnumbered young men so outfought a superior enemy as solely to prevent a certain invasion of Britain. Almost none of which is true”. Dr Andrew Gordon argues that it was "hogwash" to suggest that Germany failed to invade in 1940 "because of what was done by the phenomenally brave and skilled young men of Fighter Command". The belief is based on the idea that all the time the Royal Navy existed and at such strength, the Germans would be foolish to invade Britain. Even if the RAF had been defeated the fleet would still have been able to defeat any invasion because fast ships at sea could easily manoeuvre and "were pretty safe from air attack". The German General Jodl even said himself that, as long as the Royal Navy existed, ‘an invasion would be to send my troops into a mincing machine’. Dr Gordon refers to the eventual RAF victory then as ‘a substitute victory - a substitute for the certain victory over Sealion, had the Germans been mad enough to attempt invasion’. The presence of the Royal Navy in the Channel may explain the ‘half-hearted’ efforts and tactical changes that the Germans made, almost accepting an inevitable defeat. It was the presence of the Navy, and not the RAF, which explains his lack of interest in Operation Sealion. It was a constant and underlying advantage that Britain had; and both sides knew it.

On the one hand, the leadership of Dowding and Park on the British front was swift, consistent and ultimately effective. Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding was a brilliantly able commander and was instrumental in Britain’s success. It was his planning, organisation and preparation skills before the war that were so crucial. In 1934, he had ordered the Hurricane and Spitfire into production, and he had also played a role in supporting the new Radio Direction Finding (RDF) equipment then under development, later crucial to the war effort. He had continued to prepare his Command for war, overseeing the introduction of new aircraft, bullet-proof wind-screens, and the development of the Observer Corps and the integration of RDF units with communications and control organisations into a structure far in advance of anything else in the world. He also had a brilliant right-hand man in the Air Vice Marshal Keith Park. He was in command of No. 11 Group RAF, which was responsible for the fighter defence of London and southeast England and thus his command took the brunt of the Luftwaffe's air attacks. He was, like Dowding, a shrewd tactician with a mind for strategic issues and, between them, they formed a formidable defence leadership to counter the Luftwaffe attacks.

Chaotic and disunited leadership on the German side was crucial in its eventual defeat. The was to overcome the RAF within four weeks, beginning with attacks on the airfields near the coast, and gradually moving inland toward London and the ring of Sector airfields defending it. The Luftwaffe kept broadly to this scheme, but its commanders had differences of opinion on strategy. Hugo Sperrle wanted to eradicate the air defence infrastructure by bombing. Albert Kesselring championed attacking London directly; either to bomb the British government into submission or to draw RAF fighters into a decisive battle. Göerring did nothing to resolve this disagreement between his commanders which later lead to crucial tactical and strategic errors. Added to this was the Luftwaffe’s lack of intelligence on the British Defence system due to several unsuccessful attempts to insert spies. As a result, for much of the battle, the Luftwaffe operated 'blind', unaware of their enemy's true strengths, capabilities and deployments. The Luftwaffe leadership became increasingly disconnected from reality and it was this lack of leadership, consistency and any solid intelligence which made the ‘unbeatable’ Germans ‘beatable’. The best example of this is the decision to stop consistently bombing the airbases (which was succeeding) and switch to bombing London, in the mistaken belief that one terrifying attack would break British morale. It was a major tactical error and allowed the RAF to recover and fight on.

In conclusion to this essay, radar and excellent fighters did play a vital role in Britain’s victory, but do not solely account for it. There were many other factors that, without which, the Luftwaffe would have succeeded in Operation Sea Lion; it was a combination of each. Radar gave Britain a ‘leading edge’ in an otherwise equal battle. It was crucial in accounting for the numerical disadvantage, as was the support from other countries in volunteering their pilots. Without them, the sheer number of Luftwaffe pilots would have been too great and the RAF would have been easily overcome. The Spitfire and Hurricane fighter planes provided an equal match for the Messerschmitt. Some would argue that it was the simple presence of the Royal Navy that won it for Britain, a constant warning and adherence to the Germans and an underlying British advantage. However, it is my opinion that Britain did not win the Battle of Britain, but that Germany lost it, and thus the blame must be placed onto the chaotic, indecisive and inconsistent leadership which led to crucial tactical errors. Unlike the wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe didn’t seem to have a clear strategy and seemed to fight the battle via improvisation and ‘guess-work’. It may be put down to the fact that invasion was never the ideal option – the primary aim had always been to force peace with Britain, not to attack it. However, it is more likely that Hitler himself was simply not interested or serious about the invasion at all. His long term goal had always been Operation Barbarossa; the invasion of Russia. It could be argued then that Operation Sea Lion was a psychological weapon to force Stalin into a false sense of security and thus free himself to attack Russia. He was therefore half-hearted about the attack on Britain. This disunited those beneath him which led to disagreements and conflicts which led to a weak leadership. Contrasted with the united and determined resolve of Dowding, Park, and the British people, it gave Britain a chance to fight the formidable Germans. Had Germany had a clear and consistent plan, had they continued to bomb the airbases, which was destroying the RAF day by day, they would have won. Without this, the other factors involved in British success would have been irrelevant. Britain therefore did not win the Battle of Britain; Germany lost it. J.G.